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RESCUING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGES
OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE: HOW "ATTRITION OF
PARLIAMENTARY PROCESSES" BEGAT ACCIDENTAL
AMBIGUITY; HOW AMBIGUITY BEGAT SLAUGHTER-HOUSE
Michael Anthony Lawrence*
This Essay addresses a topic of great academic and practical interest currently
facing the Supreme Court: whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which has
lain dormant since the Court's ill-conceived 1873 Slaughter-House Cases decision,
should be resurrected in order to apply the Second Amendment to the states.
The Essay makes the novel argument that the textual basis for the Slaughter-
House Court's holding regarding the clause-i.e., the lack of parallel textual con-
struction in the first two sentences of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
regarding citizenship--was in fact the wholly unintentional product of what we
might call "attrition of parliamentary processes." This analysis is not new to the
Supreme Court. Borrowed from an oral argument made before the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1882 by Roscoe Conkling (a member of the 1866 Joint Committee on
Reconstruction), the analysis played a vital role in leading the Court to its 1898
conclusion that the word "person" in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment should
be read to include not only freedmen but also white people and artificial persons,
including corporations- an interpretation substantially broader than that given
previously by the Slaughter-House majority.
Just as the Court in the last decades of the nineteenth century corrected the Court's
too-narrow interpretation of Section 1 "personhood," so it should now-finally--
begin to correct its earlier misreading of the distinction in Section 1 between U.S.
and state citizenship in order to restore the Privileges or Immunities Clause to its full
intended effect of applying the Bill of Rights (and more) to the states.
During its 2009-20 10 Term, the United States Supreme Court has its best oppor-
tunity in generations to rescue the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Clause from its wrongful 1873 banishment from the Constitution.' In McDonald v.
* Professor & Associate Dean for Graduate, International & Interdisciplinary Programs,
Michigan State University College of Law. Author, RADICALS IN THEIR OWN TIMES: FOUR
HUNDRED YEARS OF STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND EQUAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (forthcoming
2010). Special thanks to Professors Richard L. Aynes and William W. Van Alstyne for their
helpful suggestions.
' See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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City of Chicago,2 in which petitioner is asking the Court to apply the Second
Amendment to the states,' the Court may examine-for the first time in its history,
really4-the compelling evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would apply the Bill
of Rights, and more, to the states.5 Once examined, the Court may then correct the
Slaughter-House Cases' mistakenly narrow initial reading of the provision,6 and wel-
come the Privileges or Immunities Clause back, after its 136 year purgatory, into the
constitutional fold.7
2 NRAv. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. grantedsub nom. McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Sept. 30,2009) (No. 08-1521).
3 McDonald follows naturally from the Court's 2008 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128
S. Ct. 2783 (2008) decision, which held that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right that Congress may not abridge, but which expressly did not address the question of
whether the Second Amendment applies to the states.
4 As Justice Hugo Black commented in his 1947 Adamson v. California dissent:
My study of the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the expressions of those who sponsored and favored,
as well as those who opposed its submission and passage, persuades
me that one of the chief objects that the provisions ofthe Amendment's
first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish
was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states. With full knowl-
edge of the import of the Barron decision, the framers and backers of
the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to be to overturn the
constitutional rule that case had announced. This historicalpurpose has
never received full consideration or exposition in any opinion of this
Court interpreting the Amendment.
332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
Sixty-two years later, nothing has changed-the Court still has not addressed the issue.
' Elsewhere I have suggested that the Second Amendment offers a useful mechanism
to address the Privileges or Immunities Clause issue. See Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second
Amendment Incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and
Due Process Clauses, 72 Mo. L. REV. 1 (2007).
6 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72-82.
It should be noted that a proper reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause does
not moot a century-plus worth of due process jurisprudence. Indeed, the Constitution allows
for overlapping protections by the Due Process and Privileges or Immunities Clauses, providing
another form of the "double security" envisioned by James Madison. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 51 (James Madison).
Moreover, to the objection that giving full effect to the Privileges or Immunities Clause
(i.e., incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights, and more, to the states) would be too disruptive
to the states, especially relating to the Fifth Amendment grand jury and Seventh Amendment
right to jury in civil cases provisions, the Constitution itself provides a tried and true mechanism
to allay this concern: the Article V amendment process. If the people decide that they wish
to retain the Supreme Court's current doctrine of not applying certain parts of the Bill of Rights
to the states, it is within their power to do so. The amendment process would be the proper
approach to achieve this goal-by contrast, it is not proper to continue holding the Privileges
or Immunities Clause hostage.
[Vol. 18:445
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This Essay is intended to supplement the impressive body of scholarship
arguing for a reconsideration of Slaughter-House that, when considered in toto,
makes a powerful case for a resurrected Privileges or Immunities Clause. 8 Part I
briefly discusses the Slaughter-House opinion and its aftermath, summarizing both
contemporaneous and modem day criticisms of the case. Part II then engages the
Essay's main task of discussing a mostly unexplored discrete aspect of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment: specifically, why the first sentence (the Citizenship
Clause) speaks of United States and state citizenship, while the second sentence (the
Privileges or Immunities Clause) speaks only of United States citizenship.
The Essay suggests, based on the history of the congressional debates, that the
lack of a precisely parallel textual construction between Section 1 's first two sen-
tences may well have been the inadvertent product of a legislative process involving
numerous "different proposals, independent of each other, originating in different
minds, and at different times, not in the order in which they now stand.. . [but
which] came to be collected in one formulated proposal of [the] amendment." 9 We
might describe this somewhat haphazard accretion as the product of "the attrition of
parliamentary processes.'" This analysis (including the phrase itself) is borrowed
from an oral argument made before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1882 by Roscoe
Conkling1" (himself a member of the 1866 Joint Committee on Reconstruction),
which played a vital role in leading the Court to its 1898 conclusion that the word
"person" in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment should be read to include not
only freedmen but also white people and artificial persons, including corporations' 2-- an
While it is true that amending the Constitution is difficult to accomplish (it has only been
done eighteen times in the nation's history-first with the Bill of Rights and then seventeen
times since), it is not impossible. Indeed, when the people put their minds to it, it can be done
very quickly. Witness the very first amendment to follow the Bill of Rights, the Eleventh
Amendment; it took Congress less than three weeks in 1793 to approve the amendment after
a Supreme Court ruling not to its liking, and it took the states less than a year to ratify. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 222 (2d ed. 2005).
8 See, e.g., infra note 57.
9 BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION: 39TH CONGRESS, 1865-1867, 31 (1914).
10 Id.
" See Transcript ofOral Argument, San Mateo County v. S. Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885)
(No. 1063).
12 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); see, e.g., Howard Jay Graham, The "Conspiracy
Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 371-72 (1938) ("Coming from
[Conkling,] a man who had twice declined a seat on the Supreme Bench, who spoke from first
hand knowledge, and who submitted a manuscript record in support of his stand, so dramatic
an argument could not fail to make a profound impression. Within the next few years the
Supreme Court began broadening its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and early
in 1886 it unanimously affirmed Conkling's proposition, namely that corporations were
'persons' within the meaning of the equal protection clause. It is literally true therefore that
Roscoe Conkling's argument sounded the death knell of the narrow 'Negro-race theory' of
2009] 447
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interpretation substantially broader than that given previously by the Slaughter-
House majority. 3
Just as the Court in the last decades of the nineteenth century began to correct
Justice Miller's too-narrow interpretation of Section 1 "personhood,"' 4 it should now-
finally-begin to correct his misreading of the distinction between U.S. and state
citizenship in order to restore the Privileges or Immunities Clause to its full intended
effect of applying the Bill of Rights (and more) to the states.
In short, if, as appears quite possible, the lack of parallel textual construction
in Section I's first two sentences regarding citizenship was in fact wholly uninten-
tional, the disparity should be disregarded when considering the proper scope of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Then, once the textual discrepancy between the
Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause is removed as a viable
rationale, Slaughter-House simply fails.
I. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE
In 1873 the United States Supreme Court held 5-4 in Butchers' Benevolent
Association of New Orleans v. Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-
House Co. (Slaughter-House Cases)5 that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to the few privileges or immunities associated
with national citizenship, thereby leaving the states free to continue regulating (or,
more likely, not regulating) those many residual privileges and immunities said to
be associated with state citizenship. 6 Ever since the Slaughter-House decision, the
the Fourteenth Amendment expounded by Justice Miller in the Slaughter House cases. By
doing this it cleared the way for the modem development of due process of law and the corre-
sponding expansion ofthe Court's discretionarypowers over social and economic legislation.
Viewed in perspective, the argument is one of the landmarks in American constitutional his-
tory, an important turning point in our social and economic development.") (internal citations
omitted). Having identified the importance of Conkling's oral argument, Graham is largely
critical throughout the remainder of the article. See, e.g., id. at 379. Also see Graham's later
work, including, e.g., HOwARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONsTITUTION 4-10 (1968),
which explores antislavery bases for the Fourteenth Amendment.
13 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-82 (1873).
14 See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 522 (citing Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150,154
(1897); Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta RR. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 391 (1892); Santa Clara
County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)) (explaining that it is settled that a corpo-
ration is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). This Essay suggests
that the Court, if anything, was incorrect in extending 'personhood' status to corporations,
however. See generally Graham, supra note 12.
"s 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.
16 See id. at 72-82. The Court's removal of the Bill of Rights from the Fourteenth
Amendment was made explicit in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18:445
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Privileges or Immunities Clause has been a virtual nullity, offering very little protec-
tion to individuals of the several states. Once released of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause's constraints, states were free, for example, to perpetuate unjust discrimina-
tory Jim Crow laws for another ninety years,' 7 and to infringe, to this day, upon the
individual right to bear arms.
This outcome is directly contrary to what Section 1 's framers in Congress in-
tended for the clause. The framers were determined, in light of the Court's Barron v.
Baltimore8 decision holding that the Bill of Rights applies not to states but only to
Congress, to amend the Constitution to make clear that the Bill of Rights and pro-
tections of other basic civil rights do apply to the states. 19
The rest of the members of Congress in 1866 understood perfectly well that
Section 1 was intended to repudiateBarron: "Over and over [John Bingham] described
the privileges-or-immunities clause as encompassing 'the bill of rights'-a phrase he
used more than a dozen times in a key speech on February 28.' 2° In short, regarding the
effect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause on the states, there was no question2'-and
" The Court held in 1954 that "separate but equal" laws violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause, thus reversing its infamous 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) decision. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
19 To this end, in drafting Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment for the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, Representative John Bingham looked to Barron itself for guidance. Within
Chief Justice John Marshall's words he found clear instructions: "Had the framers of these
amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the state governments, they
would have imitated the firamers ofthe original constitution, and have expressed that intention,"
Marshall explained in Baron. Id. at 250. In drafting Section 1, Bingham drew a parallel from
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which provides explicitly that "No State shall...
emit Bills of Credit;... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligations of Contracts," leaving no doubt of what is prohibited of the states. U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. Bingham thus noted: "Acting upon this suggestion [from Baron] I did
imitate the framers of the original Constitution.... [I]mitating their example and imitating
it to the letter, I prepared the provision of the first section of the fourteenth amendment as
it stands in the Constitution. . . ." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871).
As Professor Akhil Amar has noted, "[t]he Supreme Court Justices in Baron asked for
'Simon Says' language, and that's exactly what the Fourteenth Amendment gave them."
AKHiL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 164 (1998).
20 See AMAR, supra note 19, at 182.
21 See id. at 181-83. Professor Amar states that
[Bingham] explained why a constitutional amendment was necessary,
citing... Barron and one of its progeny, Livingston v. Moore. The day
before, a colleague of Bingham's, Robert Hale, had suggested that states
were already bound by the Bill, but Bingham set Hale and others straight
with the following quotation from Livingston: "As to the amendments
of the Constitution of the United States, they must be put out of the
case, since it is now settled that those amendments do not extend to the
States. . .." Six weeks later Bingham... invok[ed] "the bill of rights"
2009] 449
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in response to Bingham's strong statements in the House, nobody spoke up to disagree
with him.2"
Similarly, in the Senate, Senator Jacob Howard, speaking on behalf of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, commented on May 23, 1866:
I can only promise to present to the Senate, in a very succinct way,
the views and the motives which influenced that committee...
in presenting the report which is now before us for consideration,
and the ends it aims to accomplish....
[Section 1 is intended to impose a] general prohibition upon
all the States, as such, from abridging the privileges and immu-
nities of the citizens of the United States....
It is not, perhaps, very easy to define with accuracy what is
meant by the expression, "citizen of the United States"....
To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-
for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent
and precise nature-to these should be added the personal rights
guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution; such as the freedom ofspeech. . . [and] the right
to keep and to bear arms ....
[I]t is a fact well worthy of attention that the course of de-
cision of our courts and the present settled doctrine is, that all
these immunities, privileges, rights, thus guarantied [sic] by the
Constitution or recognized by it... do not operate in the slight-
est degree as a restraint or prohibition upon State legislation.
States are not affected by them ....
[Presently,] they stand simply as a bill of rights in the Consti-
tution, without power on the part of Congress to give them full
effect; while at the same time the States are not restrained from
six times in a single speech and again remind[ed] his colleagues that it
"has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States"
that "the bill of rights ... does not limit the powers of States." In...
January 1867, while the amendment was pending in the states, Bingham
again reminded his audience that his amendment would overrule Barron.
Id. at 182-83 (internal citations omitted).
22 Id. at 187 ("[S]urely, if the words of section I meant something different, this was the
time to stand up and say so.").
[Vol. 18:445
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violating the principles embraced in them except by their own
local constitutions, which may be altered from year to year. The
great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore,
to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times
to respect these great fundamental guarantees....
I look upon the first section, taken in connection with the
fifth, as very important. It will, if adopted by the States,forever
disable every one of themfrom passing laws trenching upon those
fundamental rights andprivileges which pertain to citizens of the
United States, and to all persons who may happen to be within
their jurisdiction.2
As Professor Michael Curtis reports:
There was no extended discussion of section 1 in the Senate after
Howard spoke. Senator John Brooks Henderson's remarks on
section 1 were brief but consistent .... He discussed the first
section "only so far as citizenship is involved in it.... It makes
plain only what has been rendered doubtful by the past action
of the Government." The remaining provisions of section 1,
Henderson said, "merely secure the rights that attach to citizen-
ship in all free Governments. ' '24
The following week, after a private Republican caucus to decide upon final
adjustments to the proposal (including adding the Citizenship Clause at the eleventh
hour), the amendment was passed by a vote of 33-1 L25
That the Slaughter-House Court's narrow interpretation still controls, after lo
these many years, begs the question: Why has it survived? The most obvious
23 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (emphasis added). Senator
Howard's comments were widely reported in the local and national press. His comment that
"to these [privileges and immunities] should be addedthe personal rights guarantied [sic] and
secured by the first eight amendments" would explain why the Fourteenth Amendment's
proponents did not simply say: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the Bill of Rights' protections of citizens of the United States. Id at 2765 (emphasis added).
Additionally, Howard cited Corfieldv. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3203),
to identify some of the privileges and immunities of Article IV, Section 2. Id.
24 MICHAEL KENT CuRTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 89(1986).
2" See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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answer-one that generations of beginning law students have been taught-is that,
in strictly textual terms, Justice Samuel Miller's opinion makes sense. Specifically,
while Section I's first sentence provides that "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside," its second sentence provides, "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States.... "26 Seizing upon this language, Justice Miller wrote for the
5-4 Slaughter-House majority:
It is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection
to the citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own
State, that the word citizen of the State should be left out when it
is so carefully used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of
the United States, in the very sentence which precedes it.27
In strictly textual terms, this is a plausible interpretation. But then, in strictly
textual terms an interpretation under Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 ("No Person ex-
cept a natural born Citizen... shall be eligible to the Office of President") 28 that no
person born by Caesarian-section delivery is eligible to be President is also plausible.
We understand the ludicrousness of such an interpretation, though, relative to the
surrounding context. Likewise, once we move beyond Section l's bare text to the
context of the post-Civil War years of 1866-68, we understand that Slaughter-House's
strictly textual interpretation is also nonsense. According to the absurdity doctrine,
textual readings leading to absurd results should not control.29
The stretched interpretation did not bother Justice Miller, however-indeed,
disturbingly, it appears that neither he nor the other majority Justices nor counsel
bothered even to look at the amendment's history;0 or, if they did, they completely
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873).
28 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.5.
29 See, e.g., generally Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001 (2006).
30 In an 1879 law review article, William Royall notes:
It is a little remarkable that, so far as the reports disclose, no one of the
distinguished counsel who argued this great case (the Slaughter-House
Cases), nor any one of the judges who sat in it, appears to have thought
it worth while to consult the proceedings of the Congress which proposed
this amendment, to ascertain what it was that they were seeking to accom-
plish. Nothing is more common than this. There is hardly a question raised
as to the true meaning of a provision of the old, original Constitution that
resort is not had to Elliott's Debates, to ascertain what the framers of the
instrument declared at the time that they intended to accomplish.
William L. Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases, 4 S. L. REV.
558, 563 (1879).
[Vol. 18:445
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ignored it (evidence suggests Miller actually knew Congress's true intent).3' In any
event, despite the telling lack of evidence that the Republicans or Democrats in the
Thirty-ninth Congress or the conventions in the ratifying states considered the dis-
tinction between state and national citizenship to be especially relevant, in a neat bit
of textual sophistry, Justice Miller gave meaning to the distinction-thereby turning,
in the words of dissenting Justice Noah Swayne, "what was meant [to be] bread into
a stone.,
32
Reaction at the time of the opinion was withering. The four dissenting Justices
were unsparing in their criticism. "No searching analysis is necessary to eliminate [the
Privileges or Immunities Clause's] meaning," Justice Swayne explained.33 Further,
[i]ts language is intelligible and direct.... Every word employed
has an established signification.... There is nothing to construe.
Elaboration may obscure, but cannot make clearer, the intent and
purpose sought to be carried out.
A more flagrant and indefensible invasion of the rights of
many for the benefit of a few has not occurred in the legislative
history of the country....
The language employed is unqualified in its scope.... By
the language "citizens of the United States" was meant all such
citizens; and by "any person" was meant all persons within the
jurisdiction of the State. No distinction is intimated on account
of race or color.... [The majority] defeats, by a limitation not
anticipated, the intent of those by whom the instrument was framed
and of those by whom it was adopted.34
Regarding the Justices' responsibility in interpreting the Constitution, Swayne
continued, "[t]his court has no authority to interpolate a limitation that is neither ex-
pressed nor implied. Our duty is to execute the law, not to make it."35 Finally, to
"' Indeed, Justice Miller knew very well Congress's intent for Section 1, yet chose
to ignore it. See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the
Fourteenth Amendment, andthe Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 627,660-62
(1994) (explaining that Miller followed the debates in Congress closely; was familiar with
Judge George W. Paschal's treatise stating that "'general principles which had been construed
to apply only to the national government, are thus imposed upon the States,"' and traveled
in 1871 with a group including Bingham on a trip to the Pacific Coast where Bingham spoke
several times on the expansive meaning of the amendment).
32 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 126.
14 Id. at 126-29.
" Id. at 129.
2009]
HeinOnline -- 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 453 2009-2010
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
those objecting to a broad reading of Section 1, Swayne answered that the restrictions
imposed upon states are indeed "novel and large [but] the novelty was known and
the measure deliberately adopted."36
Justices Bradley, Field, and Chase also dissented.a7 "[C]itizenship is not an empty
name, but that, in this country at least, it has connected with it certain incidental rights,
privileges, and immunities of the greatest importance," Justice Joseph Bradley argued.38
[F]ormerly the States were not prohibited from infringing any of
the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens .... [but]
that cannot be said now .... [I]t was the intention of the people
of this country in adopting that amendment to provide National
security against violation by the States of the fundamental rights
of the citizen.39
Elaborating upon the point that fundamental rights were found in Magna Carta,
Blackstone's Commentaries, and Justice Washington's enumeration in Corfield v.
Coryell,' Bradley explained: "But we are not bound to resort to implication, or to
the constitutional history of England, to find an authoritative declaration of some of
the most important privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. It is
in the Constitution itself."'
Justice Stephen Field agreed, lamenting that if the majority's assertion that most
rights remained under state control was indeed accurate, then the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unneces-
sarily excited Congress and the people on its passage."42
The Slaughter-House dissenters' strong comments highlight that the bare 5-443
majority's approach was not, contrary to long held revisionist wisdom," a foregone
36 Id.
31 See id. at 83, 111 (majority opinion).
38 Id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 121-22.
40 Seeid. at 115-17.
41 Id. at 118.
42 Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
13 For discussion of the dynamics of this 5-4 split, see Aynes, supra note 31, at 686-87.
"4 The perpetuation of the myth of Slaughter-House's inevitability throughout much of
the twentieth century can be traced to a few influential works. See RAOUL BERGER, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989); RAOULBERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY (1977); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Felix Frankfurter,
Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. REV. 746, 750 (1965); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, 342-51
(1985); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLmCAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 114-18 (1988); H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE
MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR How THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 313
454 [Vol. 18:445
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conclusion in 1873. Indeed, if anything, the foregone conclusion at the time was
that the Fourteenth Amendment applied all rights, privileges, liberties, and immu-
nities-those enumerated within the Bill of Rights and elsewhere, as well as those
unenumerated-to the states.
The few scholars who continue to support the Slaughter-House/Cruikshank
interpretation point to the relative paucity of contemporaneous newspaper accounts
during the state ratification debates from 1866-68 as evidence for their position. "If
the amendment was truly intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the States," they
might say, "we would see evidence of that interpretation in the news of the day."'45
This argument is fallacious. The fact that available news accounts fail to explain
that the amendment would apply the Bill of Rights to the states does not mean that
the public failed to understand this intent, just as the absence of a smoking gun in a
criminal case does not mean that a shot was not taken. Juries draw conclusions based
on strong circumstantial evidence all the time. In the absence of the gun, we look
to other evidence-and here we find it, in the congressional debates and elsewhere.
Even assuming the absence of contemporaneous news stories,' who really knows
what this might mean? Maybe, after the horrific bloodshed of the recent war, the
n. 120 (2002). For early opposing views, see, e.g., Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968); William
Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History, " and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954) (effectively rebutting the claims
of Charles Fairman's enormously influential-though deeply flawed-1949 article arguing
against incorporation of the Bill of Rights, see Fairman, supra); Michael Kent Curtis, Further
Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982); Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill ofRights as a Limitation on
State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 45 (1980); Michael
Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill ofRights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237 (1982);
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of Fourteenth Amendment,
5 CONN. L. REV. 368 (1972); Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul
Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979). Later critical work includes AMAR, supra
note 19, at 188 ("Though his work has drawn much praise, in my view Professor Fairman
was unfair to Justice Black, and his unfair substance and tone put almost an entire generation
oflawyersjudges, and law professors offtrack."), and 197 ("Berger's misstatements, distortions,
and non sequiturs are legion...."); Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 1197, 1258 (1994) (revealing something
of an unholy alliance between Justice Felix Frankfurter, primary Court opponent of Justice
Black's total-incorporation-through-the-Privileges-or-Immunities-Clause approach, and Charles
Fairman, the primary scholarly opponent of this approach, in a series of letters over the course
of eight years between the two men).
41 See, e.g., Brief for Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 6-8, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009)
(No. 08-1521); see also George C. Thomas III, Newspapers and the Fourteenth Amendment:
What Did the American Public Know About Section 1, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISsuEs (forth-
coming 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1392961.
' Two recent works persuasively dispute this assumption, arguing instead that media
accounts did in fact place the public on notice. See, e.g., David T. Hardy, Original Popular
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public was so fed up that it quietly and resolutely went along with the idea that states
would henceforth be bound by the Bill of Rights-in other words, because it was so
obvious to the people that states would no longer have discretion to abridge individual
rights and liberties (i.e., "privileges and immunities"), there was simply no need to
discuss the matter. This interpretation is at least as plausible as saying, as opponents
do, that the public expressly believed the amendment would not apply the Bill of
Rights to the states.47 In short, in the final analysis, absent a strong body of contem-
poraneous statements favoring either alternative, the default conclusion must favor
the understanding as expressed by the amendment's framers and contemporaneous
commentators.
On the issue of contemporaneous understandings, an 1879 law review article by
William Royall is instructive:
It must be admitted that the construction put upon the language
of the first section of this amendment by the majority of the
[Slaughter-House C]ourt is not its primary and most obvious
signification. Ninety-nine out of every hundred educated men,
upon reading this section over, would at first say that it forbade
a state to make or enforce a law which abridged any privilege or
immunity whatever of one who was a citizen of the United States;
and it is only by an effort of ingenuity that any other sense can be
discovered that it can be forced to bear.
4 8
Those ninety-nine educated men would have based their natural conclusions
upon the many statements of numerous members of Congress and others, as well as
upon the teachings of a number of leading legal treatises of the day. As Professor
Amar explains,
John Norton Pomeroy viewed section I as "a remedy" for Barron's
rule concerning "the immunities and privileges guarded by the
Bill of Rights"; similarly, Timothy Farrar carefully elaborated
the declaratory theory of the federal Bill-indeed, in a later,
1872 edition of his treatise, Farrar noted that the amendment had
Understanding ofthe Fourteenth Amendment as Reflected in the Print Media of1866-1868,
30 WnrrrIER L. REV. 695 (2009); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights:
Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-67, 68 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1509, 1590 (2007) (explaining that "[t]he newspaper coverage of the Bingham and
Howard speeches [during the debates in Congress] provides substantial evidence that the
national body politic, during 1866-68, was placed on fair notice about the incorporationist
design of the Amendment").
47 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 45 (discussing possible interpretations of the lack of
public attention to Section 1).
48 Royall, supra note 30, at 563.
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"swept away" Barron and its progeny. Finally, in an 1868 treatise,
George Paschal noted in passing-as if the issue were obvious-
that "the general principles which had been construed to apply
only to the national government, are thus imposed [by the Four-
teenth] upon the States. Most of the States, in general terms, had
adopted the same bill of rights in their own constitutions." '9
One Senator involved in the framing of the amendment, Senator George Franklin
Edmunds, said that the Slaughter-House opinion "'radically differed"' from what
the framers had intended for Section 1.50 Political scientist John W. Burgess reflected
in 1890 that Slaughter-House eviscerated "the great gain in the domain of civil liberty
won by the terrible exertions of the nation in the appeal to arms. I have perfect con-
fidence that the day will come when it will be seen to be intensely reactionary and
will be overturned. 51
Well over a hundred years have passed since Burgess's prediction, yet we still
await Slaughter-House's day of reckoning. For the rest of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, the Supreme Court's treatment of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
has been "impoverished. '52 From a very early date, the Court simply considered the
" AMAR, supra note 19, at 210 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). An 1871 circuit
court opinion, UnitedStates v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282), validated
the accuracy of these viewpoints. Writing for the Fifth Circuit, then-future Supreme Court
Justice William Burnham Woods stated that the "rights enumerated in the first eight articles
of amendment to the constitution of the United States, are the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States. .. ." Hall, 26 F. Cas. at 82. Further, he argued that
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States here
referred to [in Section 1] ... are undoubtedly those which may be
denominated fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all
free states, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of
the several states which compose this Union.... Among these we are
safe in including those which in the constitution are expressly secured
to the people [i.e., in the Bill of Rights], either as against the action of
the federal or state governments.
Id. at81.
0 CURTIS, supra note 24, at 177.
51 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTTUrTIONAL LAW
228 (1893).
52 AMAR, supra note 19, at 213-14 (commenting that Justices throughout the years knew
they were giving the amendment short shrift); see also, e.g., Aynes, supra note 3 1, at 681-86
("Justice Moody, who refused to follow the intent of the Amendment, admitted that'[u]ndoubt-
edly, [the Slaughter-House Cases] gave much less effect to the Fourteenth Amendment than
some ofthe public men active in framing it intended."') (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 96 (1908)). Aynes also quoted Charles Warren, pointing out that in his classic, The
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issue settled---commenting, for example, in United States v. Cruikshank3 in 1876,
a mere eight years after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification: "It is now too late
to question the correctness of this construction.... or their protection in [the] en-
joyment [of rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights], therefore, the people must look
to the States."' Only once has the Court struck down a statute on grounds that it
violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and even then the Court reversed itself
just five years later."
Scholarly commentary, however, has been a different matter. After many quiet
decades, scholars began turning over rocks in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury (no doubt encouraged by Justice Black's comments in Adamson v. California"
and elsewhere) in order to better understand the Privileges or Immunities Clause, to
the point where today most scholars who have investigated the issue, while they may
differ on the scope of the clause's reach, now agree that Slaughter-House was wrongly
decided." As Justice Thomas observed in Saenz v. Roe in 1999, "[1]egal scholars
Supreme Court in United States History, 1836-1919, "Warren noted that Miller's opinion
was 'directly contrary' to the intent of the framers of the Amendment and that in its history
the Court had, with 'very little variation' acted to 'controvert the purpose of the Amendment
[and] to belittle its effect."' See id. at 685 (quoting 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 541 (1928)).
" 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
14 Id. at 552. The Court cited eight cases in support of the same conclusion reached by
Chief Justice Marshall in Barron forty-odd years earlier. Notably, all but two of the cases cited
in Cruikshank were decided before the Fourteenth Amendment's proposal and ratification,
and the two that were not, Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868), and
Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874), themselves simply cited back to the earlier
six cases without acknowledging the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, the Cruikshank
Court, with two feet firmly planted in the past, utterly ignored the possibility that the Fourteenth
Amendment might have affected a change from that which existed before the amendment's
ratification.
" See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309
U.S. 83 (1940). The Madden court cited Slaughter-House and progeny with approval, stating
that "[i]n view of our conclusions, we look upon the decision in [Colgate] as repugnant to
the line of reasoning adopted here." Madden, 309 U.S. at 93; see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S.
489 (1999) (holding that the right to travel is an attribute of national citizenship and that,
according to Slaughter-House, states are thus barred by the Privileges or Immunities Clause
from infringing the right to travel).
56 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947); see also supra note 4.
" Historian Eric Foner succinctly states the unavoidable conclusion one is forced to
draw upon examining the evidence: "[The Slaughter-House majority's] studied distinction
between the privileges deriving from state and national citizenship, should have been seri-
ously doubted by anyone who read the Congressional debates of the 1860s." ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 530 (1988). See supra note 44 for
a list of early scholars calling for the Court to revisit Slaughter-House. For later treatments,
see, e.g., DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY,
AND LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 216 (1993); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 1321-24, 1331 (3d ed. 2000); Aynes, supra note 31, at
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agree on little beyond the conclusion that the Clause does not mean what the Court
said it meant in 1873.'58 Many do agree, however, that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause includes, at a minimum, the individual civil rights secured by the first
eight amendments.59
Some federal courts are beginning to pay attention to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Saenz, though unremarkable, was an
important step in the sense that the Court as much as acknowledged the Privileges or
Immunities Clause's existence.6' The clause has been so deeply buried for so long
that even the mere recognition from the Court was positive. Dissenting in Saenz,
Justice Thomas went further: "Because I believe that the demise of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause has contributed in no small part to the current disarray of [the
Supreme Court's] Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, I would be open to reeval-
uating its meaning in an appropriate case." 6 1
A few lower courts are beginning to pay some attention to the clause as well.
Holding in Nordyke v. King that the Second Amendment is selectively incorporated
687; Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising
the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: IndividualRights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 105 (1996); Lawrence, supra note 5; Kevin Christopher
Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House
Cases, 109 YALEL.J. 643,648-49 (2000). See generally PAMELABRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCT-
ING RECONSTRUCTION 11-12, 38, 61-62 (1999) (discussing Slaughter-House as vindicating
northern Democratic perspectives on slavery); MICHAEL A. Ross, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED
DREAMS 199-210 (2003) (justifying Justice Miller's Slaughter-House opinion). One work
characterizes the Slaughter-House Cases as being unfairly scapegoated. See RONALD M. LABBE
& JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2003). Labb& and Lurie conclude that
expressions of anguish over [the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment's] supposed demise are premature. Like its
sister the contracts clause, ... [it] remains part of the living Constitution,
readily available whenever the Court wishes to employ it.... More
than a century later, blaming Miller for current judicial disinclination
to apply the clause is unwarranted. When the Court desires to utilize it,
the clause is there.
Id. at 251. Fair enough. It is now time, 2009, for the Supreme Court to do the right thing, and
resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
5 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 19; CURTIS, supra note 24, at 222 n. 19 (citing sources prior
to 1986); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,
103 YALE L.J. 57, 83-94 (1993); Lawrence, supra note 5; Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing
the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1866-67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509 (2007). But see George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627 (2007)
(casting doubt on this idea).
60 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501. The case merely identified the right to travel as one of those
few attributes of national citizenship described by Slaughter-House. See id. at 503-04.
61 Id. at 527-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause,62 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted in 2009 that it was barred by precedent from considering the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, commenting: "We are aware that judges and academics have
criticized Slaughter-House's reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause."' 3
While the Seventh Circuit's more recent opinion in NRA v. City of Chicago64
perfunctorily decided on procedural grounds not to consider the incorporation issue
under any theory, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook expressed sympathy for reviewing
Slaughter-House, commenting during oral argument:
Indeed, I entirely appreciate your argument that the Slaughter-
House Cases are wrongly decided.... But as is often said in the
bureaucracy, that's above our grade level....
• .. [T]here's a lot of rumbling about the Slaughter-House Cases
even amongst the Justices....
One potential consequence.., is that the Supreme Court will
overrule Slaughter-House and incorporate everything.67
What is most striking about this sequence is that multiple federal courts, after
having swept the Privileges or Immunities Clause under the rug for over 135 years,
are now talking in serious terms about the provision. This is a major positive step.
Summing up, as explained by Professor Michael Curtis for amicus curiae in the
2009 Ninth Circuit case, Nordyke v. King:
The Slaughter-House majority provided a radically incomplete
historical background for the Fourteenth Amendment. It ignored
Southern state suppression of civil liberty-including speech,
press, assembly, arms, and free exercise of religion-in the interest
of protecting slavery. It ignored the denial of these basic liberties
62 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009), reh 'g granted en banc, 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
63 Id. at 446 n.5 (citing Saenz, 526 U.S. at 527-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting); AMAR, supra
note 19, at 163-230; Lawrence, supra note 5, at 12-35).
64 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. grantedsub nom. McDonald v. Chicago, 78 U.S.L.W.
3137 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08-1521).
65 Recording of oral argument at 3:55, NRA, 567 F.3d 856 (No. 08-4241), available at
www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx [hereinafter NRA oral argument]. In a nod to one of
the early pioneers advocating a re-examination of the Fourteenth Amendment's history, Judge
Easterbrook also commented: "One can only imagine William Winslow Crosskey coming
back to debate this issue." See id. at 18:43; see also Crosskey, supra note 44.
' NRA oral argument, supra note 65, at 17:40.
67 Id. at 26:43.
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including the right to bear arms that characterized the quasi-
slavery of the Black Codes. Slaughter-House did discuss the
Black Codes, but failed to mention how they limited the rights of
blacks to free speech, assembly, exercise of religion, and the right
to bear arms. It totally ignored statements of leading supporters
of the Amendment. It failed to note that the words "privileges"
and "immunities" had a long history as description of liberties
such as those in the Bill of Rights. The Court suggested, incor-
rectly, that the Fourteenth Amendment was motivated simply by
the need to protect blacks.6"
While nothing can remedy the many decades of liberty already lost due to the
Supreme Court's mistaken reading of Section 1 in Slaughter-House and Cruikshank,69
the 2009-2010 Roberts Court can forever distinguish itself as the group of Justices
that finally gave effect to the People's will as expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
II. "ATRIoN OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCESSES" DURING THE
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Slaughter-House majority's ultimately dispositive strict textual reasoning
leaves us with an important lingering question: why did the Fourteenth Amendment's
framers mention "United States" and "State" citizenship in Section 1 's first sentence,
but only "United States" citizenship in the second?
68 Amicus Curiae Brief of Professors of Law in Support of the Appellants and in Support
ofReversal at 26-27, Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-15763) (citations
omitted). Amici continue:
Slaughter-House . . . suggested that almost all civil liberties were
privileges of state citizenship. Lest it should be said that there were no
privileges or immunities of national citizenship, the Slaughter-House
court suggested some: the right to visit the sub-treasuries, to travel back
and forth to Washington, D.C., to use the navigable waters, to petition
the [national as it turned out] government, and to protection on the high
seas and in foreign lands. By this extraordinary view, the privileges or
immunities clause protected the newly freed slaves both on their trans-
Atlantic cruises and once they arrived in Paris. The crucial problem
from the 1830s through the Civil War had not been the need to protect
American citizens in Paris. The problem had been to protect their
fundamental rights, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in the
slave states.
Id. at27.
69 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., ANEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
AND UNNAMED 55 (1997) (commenting that Slaughter-House "is probably the worst holding,
in its effect on human rights, ever uttered by the Supreme Court").
2009]
HeinOnline -- 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 461 2009-2010
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
This Essay suggests that there is a convincing case to be made that the disparity
was simply inadvertent 7 -the result of what may be termed the "attrition of parlia-
mentary processes."'" This is not a new argument to the Supreme Court. Indeed, the
argument appears to have played a key role in influencing the Court to depart from its
earlier narrow reading of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Slaughter-House
(yes, the same Section 1 and Slaughter-House at issue in this Essay) in favor of a
broader reading, to include not only freedmen but also white people and artificial per-
sons, including corporations, under the Due Process Clause's definition of "person. 72
Like the Due Process Clause, arguably the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
also a victim of the "attrition of parliamentary processes" that occurred during the
Fourteenth Amendment's creation.73 Just as the intended and understood broad mean-
ing of"personhood" was not initially recognized in Slaughter-House, neither was the
intended and understood broad meaning of "privileges or immunities" recognized.
And just as the Court restored the Due Process Clause to its intended scope in the late
nineteenth century,74 it should now do the same for the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The story of how the "attrition of parliamentary processes" argument factored
prominently into the Court's broadening of Section 1 begins in 1883 when Roscoe
Conkling, a former member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction,
which had drafted the Fourteenth Amendment for the Thirty-ninth Congress, argued
before the Supreme Court in San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.75
on behalf of his railroad client. Benjamin Kendrick 76 describes the scene:
70 The suggestion that the lack ofparallel construction between Section 1's first and second
sentences was wholly unintentional is based on the weight of the available evidence. To be
sure, the conclusion likely would not satisfy the most rigorous "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
or perhaps not even the intermediate "clear and convincing," evidentiary standard. That said,
preponderance of the evidence is enough for the Supreme Court to justify reconsidering
Slaughter-House.
71 See KENDRICK, supra note 9, at 3 1.
72 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
71 See KENDRICK, supra note 9, at 30-31.
71 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
71 116 U.S. 138 (1885); see Transcriptof Oral Argument, supra note 11. The Court's con-
sideration of the question of due process personhood encompassed a series of cases stretched
over a period of about fifteen years, culminating in Smyth v. Ames in 1898 when it definitively
held that "corporations are persons within the meaning of [the Fourteenth Amendment]." 169
U.S. 466, 522 (1898); see supra note 14.
76 Kendrick (presumably a Columbia Ph.D student at the time) unearthed and published,
in what was surely one of the more noteworthy Ph.D dissertations in several years, the pre-
viously unavailable Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction. His de-
scription of the Journal's journey and how he found it is quite interesting. See KENDRICK,
supra note 9, at 18-22.
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[Conkling] produced in the court room a copy of the journal of
[the Joint] committee and revealed for the frst time what pur-
ported to be the real intention of those who framed the fourteenth
amendment....
... [Upon which Conkling had] devolved the onerous task of con-
vincing a majority of the members of the Supreme Court that the
opinion of Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House cases was based
upon a misconception of the intent of the framers of section I of
the fourteenth amendment....
Though the points argued by Conkling were not decided by the
Court in the San Mateo case, yet his speech in that case marks dis-
tinctly the point at which the Supreme Court ceased to interpret
section I of the fourteenth amendment as having reference al-
most wholly to negroes, and began to regard it as having a much
broader application.77
Arguing before the Court in San Mateo, Conkling first laid some groundwork:
"The idea prevails-it is found in the opinion of the Court in the
Slaughter-House cases; it has found broad lodgment in the public
7 KENDRICK, supra note 9, at 28-29, 34; see also Graham, supra note 12, at 371-72
(describing Conkling's influence). Kendrick relates three incidents demonstrating how
Conkling's arguments influenced the Court: (a) Justice Miller's own acceptance, during the
San Mateo oral argument, of Conkling's arguments (Miller, after listening to Conkling's argu-
ment, cut off Conkling's co-counsel, saying, "'I have never heard it said in this Court or by any
judge of it that these articles [i. e., the fourteenth amendment] were supposed to be limited
to the negro race."'), KENDRICK, supra, at 34-35 (alteration in original); (b) the 1883 Santa
Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad case, 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883), in which Justice Field,
on circuit,
adopted the same attitude toward the purport of the civil rights section
of the fourteenth amendment which Conkling had enunciated in his San
Mateo speech. In fact the justice quoted several passages from that
speech, a notable one being the concluding paragraph of it in which
Conkling laid down what he considered the true method of interpretation,
id. at 35; and (c) the Supreme Court's issuing dicta in Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad,
118 U.S. 594 (1886), in 1886 that "followed Conkling's view." Id. at 36. ChiefJustice Waite
commented, as the Court was ready to receive oral argument that, "[t]he Court does not wish
to hear arguments on the question whether the provision in the fourteenth 'amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws, applies to corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does."' Id. at 27.
Kendrick concludes, "the door was [thus] opened for organized capital to contest, often-times
successfully, before the highest Court in the land, whatever laws of the states it considered
disadvantageous to its own interests."Id at 36. Again, for a more critical view of Conkling's
performance, see, e.g., Graham, supra note 12.
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understanding; that the fourteenth amendment-nay I might say
all three of the latter amendments were conceived in a single com-
mon purpose-that they came out of one and the same crucible,
and were struck by the same die; that they gave expression to
only one single inspiration. The impression seems to be that the
fourteenth amendment especially was brought forth in the form
in which it was at last ratified by the states, as one entire whole,
beginning and ending as to the first section at least, with the pro-
tection to the freedmen of the South."7
Conkling then proceeded to demonstrate how the Slaughter-House majority's
understanding of Section 1 as "one entire whole" was erroneous.79 First, he described
the process under which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted:
"It may shed some modifying light on [the Slaughter-House]
supposition, to trace the different proposals, independent of each
other, originating in different minds, and at different times, not
in the order in which they now stand, which finally, by what might
be called the attrition ofparliamentary processes in the committee
and in Congress, came to be collected in one formulated proposal
of amendment."8
Referring to the Joint Committee's journal, he explained: "' [Y]our Honors will per-
ceive that different parts of what now stands as a whole.., were separately and in-
dependently conceived, separately acted on, perfected, and reported, not in the order
in which they are now collated, and not with a single inspiration or design. q'8
For our present Privileges or Immunities Clause purposes, we may resurrect
Conkling's argument thus:
78 KENDRICK, supra note 9, at 30 (quoting Conkling's oral argument).
79 See id. at 30-31.
80 Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added) (quoting Conkling's oral argument).
81 Id. (quoting Conkling's oral argument). Conkling continued:
"These originally separate, independent propositions, came from
a joint committee of the two Houses. The committee sat with closed
doors. A journal of its proceedings was kept by an experienced recorder
from day to day.
It seems odd that such a journal has never been printed by order of
the two Houses. It has never been printed, however, or publicly referred
to before, I believe.
Having consulted some of those whose opinions it preserves, and
having the record in my possession, I venture to produce some extracts
from it ...."
Id. at31.
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"It may shed some modifying light on [the Slaughter-House]
supposition [that the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies
only to a narrow class of attributes associated with United States
citizenship], to trace the different proposals, independent of each
other, originating in different minds, and at different times, not
in the order in which they now stand, which finally, by what
might be called the attrition of parliamentary processes in the
committee and in Congress, came to be collected in one formu-
lated proposal of [Section 1 of the] amendment....
... [y]our Honors will perceive that different parts of what now
stands as a whole [i. e., the Citizenship, Privileges or Immunities,
Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses ofSection 1]... were
separately and independently conceived, separately acted on,
perfected, and reported, not in the order in which they are now
collated, and not with a single inspiration or design.' 82
Applying the Conkling analysis, when we lay the chronological development of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause alongside that of the Citizenship Clause, we see
two entirely independent, substantively different proposals. One, the former, origi-
nated early and was discussed at length in the Joint Committee and proposed first in
the House, then in the Senate; the latter, the wholly independent Citizenship Clause,
originated in the Senate very late in the process with no input from the Joint Committee,
and was tacked onto the seemingly least objectionable spot: the very beginning of
the entire amendment, at the very top of the first section of the amendment. These two
wholly independent proposals nonetheless came to be (erroneously) viewed by the
Supreme Court as a seamless matched pair.
A brief timeline helps illustrate the point:
* January 6, 1866: Joint Committee on Reconstruction meets for the first
time (House: Stevens (chair), Washburne, Morrill, Conkling, Boutwell,
Blow. Senate: Fessenden (chair), Grimes, Harris, Howard, Johnson,
Williams). 3
* January 12: Joint Subcommittee of Five (Fessenden, Howard, Stevens,
Bingham, Conkling) appointed to consider possible amendments. Repre-
sentative John Bingham first proposes equal protection language in Joint
Committee for referral to subcommittee."
82 Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 39.
8 Id. at 43-46. Bingham's proposal, introduced after discussion of now-Section 2, read:
'The Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons
in every state within this Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property."'
The motion was passed. Id. Stevens proposed adding: "'All laws, state or national, shall
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* January 16: Subcommittee of Five first reports recommended language
to Joint Committee.
" February 26: Bingham first introduces Joint Committee's proposed
language in House.86
" April 21: Representative Thaddeus Stevens first proposes full amend-
ment in five parts in Joint Committee. 7
* April 25: Bingham's Section V from April 21 is stricken in Joint
Committee 7-5.88
" April 28: Bingham proposes revised Section 1 in Joint Committee,
passes 10-3.89
" April 30: Stevens reports Joint Committee's new five part amendment
in House.9"
operate impartially and equally on all persons without regard to race or color."' The motion
was passed. Id. (quoting the records of the Joint Committee).
85 Id. at 49-51. The recommended language read: 'Article C. Congress shall have power
to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States, in every
State, the same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal pro-
tection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property."' Id. at 51 (quoting records of the Joint
Committee). The recommended language passed 10-4 in full Joint Committee. Id.
86 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866). The proposed language was as
follows:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immu-
nities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
Id. Bingham gave a speech on February 28, in which he repeatedly made clear that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause will apply the Bill of Rights, and more, to the States. Id. at
1088-95; see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
87 KENDRICK, supra note 9, at 82-84. Section I ofthe proposal read: "'No discrimination
shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."' Id. at 83. Bingham moved to insert a new
Section V, reading "'No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."' It passed the Joint Committee by 10-2. Id. at 87 (quoting
records of the Joint Committee).
88 Id. at 97-98.
89 Id. at 100, 106.
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
Id. (quoting records of Joint Committee). Bingham's proposed language is identical to that
of Section V stricken three days earlier.
9o CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866).
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• May 8-10: House debates Joint Committee's new proposal.9
" May 23: Senator Jacob Howard (standing in for Chair Fessenden, who
is ill) explains to the Senate the Joint Committee's views and intentions
for Section 1.'
* May 30: After Republican caucus, Howard first proposes Citizenship
Clause in Senate, commenting that
"[t]his amendment which I have offered is simply decla-
ratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that
every person born within the limits of the United States,
and subject to theirjurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law
and national law a citizen of the United States.... It
settles the great question of citizenship and removes all
doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the
United States.
9 3
* May 30--June 8: Senate debates the effects of the new Citizenship Clause.
Discussions chiefly involve (a) whether to include "Indians not Taxed"
language, and (b) intent to overturn Dred Scott. There is no recorded dis-
cussion about how the Citizenship Clause interrelates with the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. 94
" June 6: Joint Committee reports out to Congress on changes to joint
resolution (final meeting of Joint Committee on Fourteenth Amendment
9' Id. at 2438-41. Proponents and opponents alike recognized that the amendment would
impose profound new restrictions on states, including applying the Bill of Rights, and more,
to the states. As opponent Andrew Rogers (D-NJ) commented,
[Section 1] provides that no State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States .... What are privileges and immunities? Why, sir, all the rights
we have under the laws of the country are embraced under the definition
of privileges and immunities. The right to vote is a privilege. The right
to marry is a privilege. The right to contract is a privilege. The right to
be a juror is a privilege .... I hold if that ever becomes a part of the
fundamental law of the land it will prevent any State from refising to
allow anything to anybody embraced under this term ofprivileges and
immunities....
Id. at 2458, 2537-41 (emphasis added). To which Bingham replied again: "[The purpose of
Section 1 is] to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the
Republic and the inbom rights ofevery person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall
be abridgedor denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.'" Id. at 2542 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 2764-68; see supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text for summary of Howard's
comments.
" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866) (emphasis added). The proposed
amendment, to be added onto the beginning of Section 1, read: "[A]I persons born in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the States wherein they reside." Id. (emphasis added).
94 Id. at 2890-2939, 2961-64, 3010-42.
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issue; it appears that the Joint Committee never discussed the Citizenship
Clause proposed the previous week in the Senate).95
* June 8: Joint resolution passes Senate 33-11 .6
* June 13: Joint resolution (as modified by Senate)97 passes House 120-32.
Fourteenth Amendment is sent to states for ratification.98
Studying this chronology, it becomes clear that the Citizenship Clause and
Privileges or Immunities Clause were indeed "'separately and independently con-
ceived, separately acted on, perfected, and reported, not in the order in which they
are now collated, and not with a single inspiration or design. "99 Hence, it is al-
together plausible to conclude that the unfortunate placement of the Citizenship Clause
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause immediately next to one another (especially
since both spoke of "citizenship," albeit for their own independent purposes) led to
what probably was an unintended textual ambiguity-one that the framers failed to
detect and correct, to liberty's everlasting detriment. More pointedly, the lack of par-
allel construction between the first (Citizenship Clause) and the second (Privileges
or Immunities Clause) sentences was, in all likelihood, simply a mistake-a most un-
fortunate oversight. Scriveners' errors and their equivalents do occur (sometimes even
in constitutions) despite drafters' best efforts to avoid them. There is no evidence
that the framers intended to create a distinction between forms of citizenship in the
two clauses; they failed to detect, however, the textual ambiguity that had been in-
troduced at the eleventh hour by the addition of the Citizenship Clause. They were
mortal after all.
How could the framers have made such a damaging mistake? Recall that Section 1
was just one part of the whole proposed five part Fourteenth Amendment, and that the
Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause were just two separate
independent parts of Section 1.100 Indeed, Section 1 was not even the most discussed
of the Fourteenth Amendment sections in Congress. Rather, Section 2 (governing how
representatives would be apportioned among states in the post-Civil War Congress by
reducing representation for states denying the franchise to any adult male citizen), 101
Section 3 (disqualifying from federal or state office certain former federal or state
9' KENDRICK, supra note 9, at 120.
96 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (1866).
9' In addition to adding the Citizenship Clause, other modifications in the Senate included
the addition of a new Section 3, which "substitut[ed] the ineligibility of certain high offenders"
for the earlier version proposed by Representative Stevens which would have disfranchised
all rebels until 1870. Id. at 3148. Stevens, though unhappy with the Section 3 change, voted
for the amendment. Id. at 3148-49.
98 Id. at3149.
" KENDRICK, supra note 9, at 31 (emphasis added) (quoting Conkling's oral argument);
see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
'00 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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officeholders who had actively participated in the rebellion),1°2 and Section 4 (void-
ing any federal or state debt incurred in aid of the rebellion)1 3 were deemed of more
immediate pressing importance, and so correspondingly occupied more of the House's
and Senate's time than did Section 1.1"
Then, when Senator Howard, close to the end of the process, proposed in the
Senate that a new sentence-one that the Joint Committee had never seen-be added
(in order to "remove [] all doubt"'0 5 on the question of the people's utter repudiation of
DredScott)'" onto what was considered to be essentially a finished, already-negotiated
and already-debated amendment, the proposal was received without controversy.10 7
After all, what self-respecting reformer could argue with a sentence that guaranteed
that all persons born or naturalized in the United States would henceforth be citizens
of the states and nation in which they lived?
It is possible, moreover, to see how Congress could have missed the ambiguity
created by addition of the late-arriving Citizenship Clause, given the historical context
of the two week period between May 30 (the date the Citizenship Clause was intro-
duced and passed, without debate, in the Senate),108 and June 8 & 13, 1866 (the dates
the Senate and House, respectively, passed the Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety,
with all of its five sections and multiple provisions)."° The spring of 1866 was, after
all, a singularly momentous period in American history, with the nation just one year
removed from a war that took 600,000 lives and tore apart the Republic.' 0 So it was
not as if the Thirty-ninth Congress had nothing else on its plate-during these months,
while the House and Senate were considering passing a multifaceted amendment,
they were considering other issues of monumental importance as well."'
It is not surprising, then, that in the course of those two weeks the nuance of the
not-exactly-parallel use in the first two sentences of the term "citizenship"--the
nuance so eagerly seized upon by the Slaughter-House majority-escaped the drafters.
After all, everybody in Congress-supporters and opponents alike-had known for
months that the proposed Privileges or Immunities Clause, together with the rest of
102 Id. at § 3.
03 Id. at § 4.
104 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 19; CURTIS, supra note 24, at ch.3 (discussing the debate
and formation of each part of the Fourteenth Amendment).
5 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866).
106 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
107 The only substantive questions senators had were whether Indians would be included
in the definition of citizenship. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
'08 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890-91 (1866).
'9 See id. at 3025-55, 3122-48.
110 CIVIL WAR DESK REFERENCE XVII, 738-39 (Margaret E. Wagner, Gary W. Gallagher
& Paul Finkelman eds., 2002). See generally Richard L. Aynes, The 39th Congress
(1865-1867) and the 14th Amendment: Some Preliminary Perspectives, 42 AKRON L. REV.
1019 (2009).
.. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2887-3150 (1866).
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Section 1 and Section 5, would substantially lessen states' ultimate authority over
their citizens. That is why the opponents brayed so loudly about the Fourteenth
Amendment: they knew that states would no longer be able to deny citizens (indeed,
all manner of citizens, as specified in the newly added first sentence) the individual
liberty and equal justice the people had claimed in the Declaration of Independence,
but had been denied for four score and ten years since. All of this the opponents
understood, so they objected-and they lost. The late-arriving Citizenship Clause
did nothing to change any of this-it simply stated what had become axiomatic in the
late war: citizenship would not depend on skin color.
CONCLUSION
This Essay suggests that, like the Due Process Clause, the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause too was a victim of the "attrition of parliamentary processes" that
occurred during the Fourteenth Amendment's creation. Just as the intended and
understood broad meaning of "personhood" was not initially recognized in
Slaughter-House, neither was the intended and understood broad meaning of "privi-
leges or immunities." In the former case, however, the Court corrected Justice
Miller's narrow misinterpretation of Section 1, thus restoring the intended scope of
due process "personhood" to include white people and artificial persons such as
corporations. The Court now has the opportunity to do the same with the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, and likewise restore this majestic provision to its intended
scope of applying the Bill of Rights (and more) to the states. It is never too late in
the day for the Court to offer more faithful interpretations of the Constitution.
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